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This study analyzes the links between eﬃciency and the decentralization of 
competencies among Spanish local governments for years 1995 and 2000. The aim is pursued 
by considering a two-stage activity analysis model in which the performance of each 
municipality is ﬁrst evaluated against other municipalities with a similar level of competencies 
and, in a second stage, it is compared with that of other municipalities for which 
decentralization remains at a more preliminary stage. The model also considers an index aimed 
at measuring whether tendencies towards higher (or lower) beneﬁts from decentralization might 
exist over time. Results suggest that some municipalities could manage their resources more 
eﬃciently if bestowed on more competencies. Although this sort of decentralization economies 
do not emerge for all municipalities, their magnitude clearly overshadows the diseconomies 
found if downscaling of decision making went too far and least decentralized municipalities 
were conferred on more competencies. In addition, the likely eﬃciency gains from enhanced 
decentralization increase over time. 
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El objetivo de este trabajo es analizar los vínculos entre eficiencia y descentralización 
de competencias para los ayuntamientos españoles durante los años 1995 y 2000. Para ello, se 
considera un modelo de análisis de la actividad en dos etapas en el que, en primer lugar, la 
eficiencia de cada municipio se evalúa frente a la de otros municipios con un mismo nivel de 
competencias y, en una segunda etapa, se compara con el de aquellos municipios para los cuales 
la descentralización de competencias permanece en un nivel inferior. El modelo también 
considera un índice que mide si hay tendencias hacia mayor -o menor- beneficios de la 
descentralización a lo largo del tiempo. Los resultados indican que algunos municipios podrían 
gestionar sus recursos más eficientemente de tener un mayor nivel de competencias. Aunque 
este tipo de economías de descentralización no existen para todos los municipios, su magnitud 
es superior a la magnitud de las deseconomías que se dan para otros municipios. Asimismo, las 
ganancias de eficiencia obtenidas de una hipotética descentralización aumentan con el tiempo. 
Palabras clave: Análisis de la actividad, descentralización, eficiencia, gobierno local 1. Introduction
Since Tiebout’s 1956, or Oates’ 1972 classic studies, a growing stem of the literature on public econo-
mics has been devoted to emphasize the beneﬁts of political decentralization and the federal state—and
the competition among regional or local governments that it makes possible—to the detriment of cen-
tralized systems in which resource allocation and spending decisions are made by central governments
(Cai and Treisman, 2004). Some authors consider it has already become a classic problem in public
ﬁnance and public economics, in which the question as to how should authority provide the public
goods to be allocated, and how should the costs of provision be shared, requests appropriate answers
(Besley and Coate, 2003).
A deeper scrutiny would show that the beneﬁts attributable to decentralization deal primarily
with the enhanced responsiveness of governments to local needs by ‘tailoring levels of consumption
to the preferences of smaller, more homogeneous groups’ (Wallis and Oates, 1988, p. 5) or, according
to Tiebout (1956), Oates (1972), and others, it is better able to accommodate diﬀerences in tastes
for public goods and services and, therefore, decentralization would be justiﬁed from an economic
eﬃciency perspective. Therefore, the most compelling argument in favor of decentralization is that it
can better match citizens’ preferences for public goods. On the other hand, opponents to decentrali-
zation such as Crook and Sverrisson (2001), or Smith (1985), argue that power should remain in the
hands of central governments since local authorities’ lack of human, ﬁnancial and technical resources
will prevent them from providing appropriate public services under a decentralized scenario (Faguet,
2004). Speciﬁcally, enhanced decentralization may lead to higher administrative costs which arise due
to the diﬃculties of exploiting the economies of scale in local governments.
The topic is relevant for both developing and developed economies. In the world of development it
is at the center of reform eﬀorts not only throughout Latin America and many parts of Asia and Africa
but also throughout several formerly planned economies. On the other hand, the guises of subsidiarity,
devolution and federalism have prompted its analysis as a central policy issue in United States and
several European Union countries. Some recent empirical studies have sought responses as to whether
decentralization increases governments’ responsiveness in developing countries (see Faguet, 2004),
yielding aﬃrmative answers. However, although the theoretical literature is enormous, empirical
applications are comparatively much fewer, especially those focusing on developed countries. Indeed,
the topic is often discussed in the European Union agenda, seeking to establish and monitor a more
precise delimitation of powers, competencies and responsibilities between the European Union and
the member states (Cerniglia, 2003).
This study focuses in Spain, one of the European Union countries where decentralization has been
relentless since the establishment of the 1978 Constitution which, indeed, deﬁned a decentralized
organization of the state by featuring autonomous communities or regions (NUTS2 in European
terminology), reviving local governments (NUTS5 in European terminology), and redeﬁning centralgovernment positions, whose relationships were newly framed. Since then, regional governments have
been gaining competencies to the detriment of the central government, and their share of total public
spending in Spain has been growing at a remarkable pace.
However, the second decentralization, from either regional or central government to municipalities,
has been far more modest, and local governments’ share of total public spending has remained relati-
vely stable—at least compared to public regional spending. Proponents for the second decentralization
in Spain argue that decentralizing towards lower (local) layers of government not only would increase
the size of local public sector but also, as suggested by other proponents for decentralization, would
enhance their capabilities for managing eﬃciently both their ﬁnancial needs and ﬁnancial resources.
Indeed, previous literature, given the conﬂicting nature of economies of scale—which disappear
if decentralization is excessive—and “Leviathan” tendencies, i.e., the risk of developing into an ex-
cessively large governmental unit less responsive to consumer demand, have attempted to analyze
local government eﬃciency. In particular, Hughes and Edwards (2000) found that “ineﬃciencies rela-
ting to the size and degree of concentration in government indicate that greater decentralization and
decreased spending in the public sector increase eﬃciency”.
However, the literature on the eﬃciency of local governments is not abundant, and the Spanish
case constitutes by no means an exception. Some previous studies focusing on the eﬃciency of Spanish
municipalities are those by Prieto and Zof´ ıo (2001) and Gim´ enez and Prior (2003), or Balaguer-Coll
et al. (2003), which diﬀer from ours in several aspects, including the regions studied.1 In particu-
lar, they focus on Castilla-Le´ on, Catalunya, and Comunitat Valenciana municipalities, respectively,
whereas our study is focused on a sample of most Spanish regions.2 A related branch of the litera-
ture attempts to evaluate Spanish local services, yet concentrating on the analysis of single services:
garbage collection, urban public transport, water supply, local police, ﬁre service, etc. For instance,
Bosch et al. (2000) deal with the measurement of eﬃciency in Spanish municipal garbage collection
services. In contrast, our analysis focuses on the evaluation of local organizations as a whole, such as
decision-making units that organize the production process of multiple services. Therefore, this global
analysis is more closely related to research studies focusing in the eﬃciency of local governments in
other European Union countries, such as those by Vanden Eeckaut et al. (1993) and De Borger and
Kerstens (1996a)—although the set of techniques considered here have been speciﬁcally designed to
our setting.
The literature on decentralization in Spain is far more abundant, since it is directly related to
the literature on federalism and spending responsibilities among diﬀerent government levels. A good
prospect is provided by Molero (2001). However, the debate has traditionally leaned towards the
1Other studies focusing on Spanish local government issues include those by Bosch and Su´ arez-Pandiello (1993, 1995),
Gil Jim´ enez (2001), P´ erez Blanco (1995), P´ erez Garc´ ıa (1995), Sol´ e-Oll´ e and Bosch (2002), Sol´ e-Oll´ e (1997, 2001), or
Vela (1996), amongst others, although they do not deal speciﬁcally with eﬃciency issues.
2All those for which information is available so far. Details are deferred to Section 3.allotment of responsibilities between central and regional governments whereas, as suggested above,
local governments have played a comparatively minor role. It has also dealt more prone to the
analysis of ﬁscal decentralization, in general, and other ﬁscal policy issues, in particular, rather than
decentralizing competencies towards lower levels of government. However, as mentioned earlier, most
studies conﬁne their interest to decentralization from central government to regional governments,
mirroring the process that has been taking place in the dynamics of Spanish government structure.
However, if the intention is to analyze the hypothetical links between (enhanced) decentralization
and eﬃciency, the empirical evidence is entirely yet to come—not only in Spain, but also the scope is
widened so as to encompass other countries.3 This gap could be related to the diﬃculties in linking
both issues. Our approach considers that beneﬁts from decentralization might be detected because of
the diﬀering competencies among Spanish municipalities based on their population size. Therefore, if
a positive relationship between eﬃciency and population size emerged (since large municipalities are
endowed with more competencies), it could be argued that beneﬁts from enhanced decentralization
might exist.
Yet, since competencies depend on the size (population) of each municipality, it is not an easy
task to disentangle whether beneﬁts accrue due to a wider range or competencies or simply because
agglomeration economies might exist. However, considering both expenditures and revenues for each
municipality may be more directly linked to the amount of services and facilities they must provide,
and considering also that the inclusion of each observation on each size category depends on a thin
line,4, we argue that should performance diﬀerences exist, it is more likely that they were related to
the decentralization issue.
On this point, local corporations’ competencies are established by the Ley Reguladora de Bases
del R´ egimen Local (“Regulating Local Regime Law”), as well as the Article 25.1 of the Spanish
Constitution. These competencies depend on each municipality’s population, and their speciﬁcs are
provided in Section 3. One of the most marked diﬀerences consists in their inability to pass laws for
self-government, in contrast to regional governments. These corporations are made up not only by
municipalities but also provinces, islands, metropolitan areas, districts, and autonomous cities (Molero,
2001). However, our study is entirely conﬁned to the eﬃciency of municipalities, since they constitute,
along with regional governments, the most important players in the decentralization process.
Another related branch of literature comes from the study of scope economies among municipalities.
Accordingly, as suggested by Grosskopf and Yaisawarng (1990), some cost beneﬁts could accrue due
to a broader range of services and facilities being provided. For instance, billing for garbage services
could utilize existing computer ﬁles from the property tax department. Therefore, those municipalities
3The only published study related to our research interest is Ag´ undez Garc´ ıa and Pedraja Chaparro (2003), yet the
analysis is conﬁned to ﬁscal decentralization.
4For instance, there might exist municipalities very similar in size yet they fall under diﬀerent competencies’ categories
just because of a tiny diﬀerence in the number of inhabitants.with less competencies could not beneﬁt from this type of economies. The linkage to our speciﬁc
decentralization setting is also clear, since the beneﬁts of economies of scale may be lost in small-scale
provision, and administrative costs may increase due to higher overhead (see Hughes and Edwards,
2000). The linkage is further understood if one considers that the existing comparison in the scope
economies literature between diversiﬁed and specialized municipalities is paralleled in our study by
comparing here municipalities with more competencies to municipalities with less competencies or, in
other words, municipalities beneﬁtting in diﬀering degrees from decentralization.
The plan of the paper is as follows. Section 2 is devoted to present the model aimed to estimate
whether decentralization economies might exist. Section 3 presents data, inputs and outputs. Section
4 presents and comments on the most relevant results, whereas Section 5 sums up some concluding
remarks.
2. Methods
Our methods are based on activity analysis techniques, which impose a minimum of assumptions
on the functional forms being estimated. Speciﬁcally, we rely on the seminal ideas by Charnes et al.
(1978), who developed the Data Envelopment Analysis (DEA) model to estimate the level of technical
eﬃciency in production. Later on, Deprins et al. (1984)5 phased in Free Disposable Hull (FDH), a
more ﬂexible approach in which the convexity assumption on the production (or technology) set
inherent to DEA was dropped. Both methods are based on the frontier analysis suggested by Farrell
(1957). However, although many empirical applications have leaned heavily towards DEA, we will
conduct our study using FDH, not only because of its higher ﬂexibility (achieved by dropping the
convexity assumption) but also because of its comparatively superior asymptotic properties, as shown
by Park et al. (2000). Anyway, both methods share their most intrinsic underpinnings, i.e., they are
nonparametric and, therefore, they do not stipulate a functional form for the production process and
there is no assumption as to the distribution of the error term.
Several public sector empirical studies have also considered activity analysis techniques. See,
for instance, the contributive book edited by Fox (2001).6 Some applications speciﬁcally focused
on local government eﬃciency are, amongst others, those by De Borger and Kerstens (1996a,b),
Vanden Eeckaut et al. (1993), Gim´ enez and Prior (2003), Grosskopf and Hayes (1993), Grosskopf
and Yaisawarng (1990), Hayes and Chang (1990), Ruggiero (1995), Hughes and Edwards (2000),
Worthington (2000), Worthington and Dollery (2000b,c,d) or, more recently, Sampaio de Sousa and
Stoˇ si´ c (2005). However, the speciﬁc links between eﬃciency and decentralization have only been
partially examined in Hughes and Edwards (2000), although pursuing diﬀerent aims.
There are also studies focusing on local government eﬃciency which have considered parametric
5See also Tulkens (1993).
6See also Ruggiero (1996).techniques. See, for instance, Deller (1990, 1992), or Taylor (1995), amongst others. In this case,
the parametric “straitjacket” is much tighter than the convexity assumption established by DEA—
needless to say compared to the even higher ﬂexibility of FDH. In turn, parametric methods have
the ability of disentangling ineﬃciency from random error—which both DEA and FDH are unable
to disentangle. Despite this apparent trade-oﬀ, most public sector applications have usually leaned
towards nonparametric methods such as those considered here. In addition most of the newest methods
to measure eﬃciency fall within the broad category of nonparametric methods. See, for instance,
Cazals et al. (2002), or Aragon et al. (2005).
2.1. The FDH nonconvex evaluation
To specify the model aimed at establishing the likely linkages between eﬃciency and (enhanced)
decentralization, we ﬁrst describe the variables needed. We assume that for each of the S production
units to be evaluated, we know both the vector xs of inputs consumed, xs = (xs
1,...,xs
J) and the
ys vector of outputs, ys = (ys
1,...,ys
I). We also assume that the production technology describing
the process to translate inputs into outputs is known and can be summarized through the input
requirement set:
L(ys) = {x|(x,ys) is feasible}. (1)
The input set L(ys) denotes the collection of input vectors x ∈ RJ
+ able to generate, at least, the
output vector ys ∈ RI
+. It provides a general representation of the technology in terms of input and
output quantities. No prices are involved, and no behavioral assumptions are required.
When input prices are available, and cost minimization is a reasonable behavioral assumption, it is
possible to develop a price-dependent characterization of technology. Assuming prices for each s obser-
vation, ps = (ps
1,...,ps








+, and the observed total costs as TC(ys) =   1cs = psxs. Treating outputs ys as
given, we can deﬁne a price-dependent characterization of the technology:
TC∗(ys) = min{  1c = psx∗|x∗ ∈ L(ys)} (2)
where ps = (ps
1,...,ps
J) ∈ RJ




the input vector minimizing total costs. TC∗(ys) shows the minimum total expenditure to produce
output vector ys at input prices ps.
Now we can deﬁne an overall cost frontier coeﬃcient OE(ys) for each s unit as the ratio between






psxs ≤ 1. (3)If OE(ys) = 1, then the evaluated observation is operating at the best practice costs, given the
outputs and the input prices. However, when OE(ys) < 1, the observation is not part of the cost
frontier; akin to this, [1 − OE(ys)] would indicate the proportional reduction in costs that could be
obtained if unit s operated on the cost-eﬃcient frontier.
According to F¨ are et al. (1994), the overall cost eﬃciency coeﬃcient, OE(ys), is obtained by




s.t. TCsα − λTC ≥ 0,
−ys + λM ≥ 0,
λ ≥ 0,
(4)
where TC is a vector containing the observed total costs for all S units, M is a matrix containing
the observed S output vectors and λ is the activity vector denoting the intensity levels at which the
S observations are conducted. The solution of the linear programming problem (4) yields for each s
observation optimal values for OE (i.e., the cost eﬃciency coeﬃcient) and λ∗, the activity vector. As
mentioned above, when information on input prices and input quantities is not available, all units are
assumed to face the same input prices, and we operate with input costs variables. Each production
unit’s eﬃciency is measured relative to the eﬃciency of all other units and, by construction, all units
are on or below the frontier.
Program (4) postulates a convex technology, under which the frontier is composed by real ob-
servations and linear combinations of them. In other words, every convex combination of feasible
production plans is also feasible. The problem is that it is not a priori granted whether the convexity
postulate were the most suitable assumption under any circumstances, and it may be worth contem-
plating other technological references. In this case, i.e., if convexity is not postulated, we can adopt the
so-called nonconvex reference technology deﬁned by the FDH (Free Disposable Hull) frontier (Deprins
et al., 1984). As mentioned earlier, among other advantages with respect to convex formulations of
the technology, it has been demonstrated that when the true technology is convex, the FDH estima-
tor converges to the true estimator. In contrast, when the true technology is nonconvex, the convex
estimator causes speciﬁcation error (see Park et al., 2000; Simar and Wilson, 2000). Further rationale
on the advantages of FDH can be found in Briec et al. (2004).
In order to evaluate the nonconvex eﬃciency, Tulkens (1993) and Tulkens and Vanden Eeckaut




s.t. TCsα − λTC ≥ 0,
−ys + λM ≥ 0,
− →
1 λ = 1,
λ = {0,1}.
(5)
This program is the nonconvex version of the variable returns to scale nonparametric cost frontier
evaluation. For us, however, Program (5) is not applicable provided that, as mentioned earlier,
programs (7) and (8) required the comparison of observations with diﬀerent sizes. In order to solve
this problem, we put forward a new version of the FDH programs that, while keeping the nonconvexity
technological assumption, allows the comparison of observations with diﬀerent dimensions by ‘cloning’
the eﬃcient smaller observations. Therefore, we can corroborate what the more eﬃcient way to provide
services to 100,000 inhabitants is: i) in ﬁve municipalities with populations of 20,000 each; ii) in two
municipalities with populations of 50,000 each; or iii) in one municipality with population of 100,000
inhabitants. Strictly speaking, this is not a constant returns to scale comparison, as no comparison
among large and small municipalities (or, more generally, municipalities of diﬀerent population sizes)
is performed, yet we can explore what the most eﬃcient population size as to provide public services
is. The modiﬁcations to introduce in Program (5) so as to make possible the ‘cloning process’ are




s.t. TCsα − λTC ≥ 0,
−ys + λM ≥ 0,
zB ≥ λ,
− →





Program (6) accepts every integer value for the λ components of the activity vector, yet restricting
λ not to be larger than a binary variable, z, multiplied by a parameter which tends to inﬁnity. These
new restrictions allow λ to take any integer value, precisely for the component of z with unitary value.7
However, application of program (6) does not allow disentangling whether the move towards greater
7Program (6) holds similarities with the proposal made by Gim´ enez (2004), yet restricting the activity vector to be
always an integer.decentralization will turn into eﬃciency gains or, in other words, whether ‘economies of decentraliza-
tion’ might exist. For this, we classify the S units into two sub-samples. The ﬁrst one, with S1 units,
would encompass observations with the smallest size (in our current setting, municipalities with po-
pulations of under 5,000). In the second sub-sample there are the S2 units with larger size. Therefore,
the total sample is partitioned into two sub-samples just as described, i.e., S = S1 + S2.
We now adopt a two-stage procedure, similar to that in Prior and Sol` a (2000). In the ﬁrst stage,
the largest observations are taken separately, and the traditional cost frontier evaluation is applied.
















where the s2 subscript indicates that the unit being evaluated is aﬃliated to group 2. Therefore,
program (7) is the standard nonparametric cost frontier evaluation, yet it only includes a speciﬁc
sub-sample of observations, namely, the largest ones.
In the second stage, the eﬃciency level of the S2 sub-sample is evaluated again, yet exclusively




s.t. TCs2γ − λTC
s1 ≥ 0,
−ys2 + λMs1 ≥ 0,
zB ≥ λ,
− →





Programs (6), (7) and (8) diﬀer in that, when evaluating the same s unit, the reference frontier is
alternatively constructed with an uncontrolled mix of observations (program (6)), with only observa-
tions of the same characteristics (program (7)) and, ﬁnally, with the observations with lower level of
decentralized services (program (8)). Therefore, in the ﬁrst-stage analysis, when solving program (6),
we are combining observations with diﬀerent levels of decentralized services. On the other hand, in thesecond-stage, since the units we are interested in do not present the required level of homogeneity in
their operational conditions, it is better to establish these frontiers separately, as deﬁned in programs
(7) and (8). In so doing, we obtain results that are more reliable, and easier to translate into policy
proposals.
This two-stage evaluation process holds an additional advantage. As we obtain a double frontier
reference, comparing these two groups of coeﬃcients allows disentangling whether substantial eﬃciency
diﬀerences might exist. Accordingly, considering that the βs2 coeﬃcient indicates the proportion in
costs (0 < βs2 ≤ 1) that unit s2 requires to reach the frontier corresponding to the same group, and
γs2 indicates the proportion in total costs (0 < γs2 ≤ 1) that unit s2 requires to achieve the frontier
deﬁned by the sub-sample S1 (the less decentralized municipalities), the relationship between βs2 and
γs2 would indicate either the presence of “decentralization” economies, i.e., those existing for larger
municipalities (which are endowed with more competencies) or, on the other hand, output complexity,
which exists when municipalities have to provide more complex, and hence, costly, ranges of services
and facilities to higher populations. Speciﬁcally, when βs2 < γs2, it would indicate the case where
municipalities with more decentralized services (S2) operate with lower total costs than municipalities
with lower levels of decentralization (S1). On the other hand, when βs2 > γs2, then municipalities
with more decentralized services (i.e., those aﬃliated to sub-sample S2) provide more complex—and
more costly—services than municipalities with lower levels of decentralization (aﬃliated to sub-sample
S1).
This evaluation process is illustrated in Figure 1 and Figure 2. Let us assume that observations A,
B and G are drawn from the sub-sample of less decentralized municipalities (S1), and observations C,
D, E and F are drawn from the sub-sample of more decentralized municipalities (S2). Figure 1 shows
how the linear programming problem (7) establishes the reference frontier taking into account only
the observations aﬃliated to the group of more decentralized municipalities. Unit D is the only cost
eﬃcient observation, whereas the remainder (observations C, E and F) show overall cost ineﬃciency.
When we compare the units referred to in the paragraph above with the frontier of small, or less
decentralized municipalities (Figure 2), linear programming problem (8) indicates that the benchmark
is now that corresponding to the frontier of municipalities aﬃliated to group S1. Graphically, the
benchmark would then be constructed by taking observation B, compared to which units C, E and
F become ineﬃcient, yet leaving aside observation D.
In the particular setting being described, when analyzing unit s2, it is possible to measure the
decentralization economies achievable when mingling these two frontiers by means of the γs2/βs2
ratio. If the ratio were above unity, it would indicate that economies of decentralization exist, i.e.,
municipalities endowed with higher powers make the most of a sort of this fact. On the other hand, if
the ratio γs2/βs2 were below unity it would suggest that the range of services and facilities provided


















Taking into account that observations A, B and G are drawn from the sub-sample of less decentralized municipalities
(S1), and observations C, D, E and F are drawn from the sub-sample of more decentralized municipalities (S2), the
graphic illustrates how the linear programming problem (7) establishes the reference frontier taking into account only
the observations aﬃliated to the group of more decentralized municipalities. Unit D is the only cost eﬃcient observation,


















Linear programming problem (8) indicates that the benchmark is that corresponding to the frontier of municipalities
aﬃliated to group S1 (less decentralized municipalities). Therefore, considering that unit B is aﬃliated to group S1,
then units C, E and F become ineﬃcient, and unit D is left aside.municipalities—which are bound to provide their population with fewer services and facilities.
2.2. Temporal analysis
Let us assume now that we have data corresponding to two time periods (t and t + 1). It is feasible





Its value will be above or below unity depending on whether decentralization economies or the
output complexity increase between periods t and t + 1, respectively. If nothing changes the index
equals to one.
This temporal index can be decomposed in a similar way to the Malmquist indices (see Caves et al.,
1982; Grosskopf, 2003). In so doing, we are capable of determining the importance of technical change
(shifts of the frontier between t and t+1), and eﬃciency change (taking into account the movements in
the distance separating the observation under analysis from their respective frontiers). As suggested by
Worthington and Dollery (2000a), this distinction is important from a policy viewpoint, since those
changes in productivity growth due to ineﬃciency claim for diﬀerent policies to those concerning
technical change (see Grosskopf, 1993). As suggested by Worthington and Dollery (2000a) sluggish
productivity due to ineﬃciency may have been brought about by institutional barriers to the diﬀusion
of innovations; in such a case, policies aimed at removing such barriers would be more eﬀective than
those aimed at innovation.
Allowing for this decomposition involves deﬁning two additional linear programming problems





















1 λ = 1,
λ ≥ 0.
(11)Finally, having these new cost eﬃciency coeﬃcients, it is straightforward to decompose the index
















The technical change index quantiﬁes the observed changes in the frontier of the larger munici-
palities w.r.t. the change in the frontier made up by smaller municipalities. This index encompasses
the relative shifts in best-practice technology, corresponding to the two samples (S1 and S2) under
analysis, between periods t and t + 1. A deeper scrutiny of its components corroborates that the
cost eﬃciency coeﬃcients ‘benchmark’ the same observation with the cost frontiers corresponding to
periods t a and t + 1. A technical change index larger than the unity indicates that the frontier of
the sub-sample S2 improves more rapidly than the frontier corresponding to the sub-sample S1 (i.e.,
larger municipalities go through faster technical progress, or more sluggish technical regress). When
the technical change index is below unity, then the technical progress of the S1 sub-sample is higher
than the technical progress corresponding to the sub-sample S2 (i.e., small municipalities experience
faster technical progress, or a lower technical regress).
In contrast, the eﬃciency change index (or catching up eﬀect), shows what the changes in the
relative cost eﬃciency levels are, corresponding to the two samples—S1 and S2—under analysis,
between periods t and t + 1. This index deﬁnes the distance of the observed costs for periods t and
t + 1 with respect to the frontier in period t. It indicates whether observations in t + 1 are closer to
the frontier than what they are in period t. When the eﬃciency change index is larger than unity,
the cost eﬃciency change between periods t and t + 1 improves more for the S2 sub-sample than for
the S1 sub-sample. On the other hand, when the eﬃciency change index is below unity, the distance
with respect to the frontier of the sub-sample S1 has increased more than the distance respect to the
sub-sample S2.
2.3. Testing the closeness between eﬃciency distributions
Since the analysis considered above is based on comparing the results yielded by diﬀerent linear
programming problems which fall under the broad category of nonparametric techniques to measure
eﬃciency, we may also resort to nonparametric techniques to test formally whether eﬃciency scores
diﬀer signiﬁcantly. Speciﬁcally, following Fan and Ullah (1999), we may test whether two unknown
distributions, which in our speciﬁc setting would be related to those for βs2 and γs2 scores, diﬀer
signiﬁcantly. Therefore, if f and g are the distributions corresponding to, say, βs2 and γs2 for year
1995 under the convex DEA evaluation, the null hypothesis being tested would be H0 : f(βs2) = g(γs2)
against the alternative, H1 : f(βs2)  = g(γs2).
Although one might consider a two-sample t-test for the comparison of both distributions, there aresome assumptions such as the independence of observations which eﬃciency scores do not meet—given
they are the result of linear programming problems and, therefore, are dependent in the statistical
sense. This caveat might be overcome by considering some nonparametric alternatives to the two-
sample t-test such as the Kruskal-Wallis test. However, we consider it is far more luring exploiting
nonparametric statistical methods aimed at exploring statistical diﬀerences between our eﬃciency
indicators since they focus on the entire distributions instead of conﬁning the comparison to summary
statistics—such as the mean, in the case of the two-sample t-test, or the median, in the case of the
Kruskal-Wallis test.
The test is based on the generally accepted idea of measuring the global distance (closeness)






















f(x)dF(x) + g(x)dG(x) − 2g(x)dF(x)
¢
(13)
where F and G would be two candidates for the distribution of X, with probability density functions
f(x) and g(x). However, we may turn to kernel smoothing methods (Silverman, 1986) to estimate


















































The integrated square error constitutes the basis to build the statistic on which the test is based



























and h would be the bandwidth, window width or smoothing parameter, which we estimate using the
plug-in method suggested by Sheather and Jones (1991).3. Data, inputs, and outputs
Our analysis is performed for a sample of Spanish municipalities with a population over 1,000 inha-
bitants for years 1995 and 2000. Input and output data come from the same institution, although
from diﬀerent sources. The latter are provided by the Spanish Ministry for Public Administration,
through the information gathered in the survey on local infrastructures and facilities (Encuesta de
Infraestructuras y Equipamientos Locales). The focus of our analysis is conﬁned to years 1995 and
2000, since these are the only years for which available information exist so far. On the other hand,
local governments’ budgetary data have been used to construct inputs. In this case frequency is much
higher, since these data are available for every year; however, we are bound by the available informa-
tion in the output side. Those regions meeting our criteria (data for years 1995 and 2000, and data
for both inputs and outputs) were Andaluc´ ıa, Arag´ on, Asturias, Canarias, Cantabria, Castilla-Le´ on,
Castilla-La Mancha, Extremadura, Murcia, La Rioja, and Comunitat Valenciana. After removing all
those municipalities for which information was not available for both years 1995 and 2000, the sample
was made up by 1,315 municipalities for each sample year. Unfortunately, there was no information
for the remaining regions for several reasons. By the time of conducting this study, Madrid had not
presented the information on outputs yet. Information on outputs is neither available for Catalunya,
the Basque Country and Navarra.
The translation of the production process at municipal level in terms of the standard notion of
transforming inputs into outputs very often presents diﬃculties in its measurement. In the case of
municipalities it is quite common to distinguish three stages in this production process (Bradford
et al., 1969). First, there is the transformation of primary inputs (labor, equipment and external
services) into intermediate outputs (e.g., hours of traﬃc control or the extension of police services).
Second, these intermediate outputs are transformed into direct outputs (D-outputs as termed by
Bradford et al., 1969) ready for “consumption” (e.g., the number of urban streets controlled or the
number of cases treated). Third, these direct outputs ultimately have welfare eﬀects on consumers
(e.g., increasing perceptions and feelings of safety and welfare). This ﬁnal process is captured by
outcome indicators (labeled C-outputs by Bradford et al., 1969) that reﬂect the degree to which the
direct outputs of municipal activities translate into welfare improvements as perceived by consumers.
Theoretically, eﬃciency can be measured at each stage of this production process. Yet in practice, data
availability problems typically do not allow us to distinguish between primary inputs, intermediate
outputs, direct outputs, and ﬁnal welfare eﬀects. For this reason the analysis is very often limited to
the study of the ﬁrst and second phases of this process: relations between primary inputs or activities
and direct outputs.
The selection of outputs is based on the services provided by each municipality.8 Speciﬁcally, all
8See Ley 7/1985, April, 2nd, Reguladora de Bases de R´ egimen Local (LBRL). The distribu-
tion of responsibilities among central, regional, and local administrations may be found at the URLlocal authorities must provide public street lighting, cemeteries, waste collection and street cleaning
services, drinking water to households, access to population centers, surfacing of public roads, and
regulation of food and drink. In some cases we have to select proxies for these services. For instance,
as pointed out by De Borger and Kerstens (1996a), population is assumed to proxy for the various
administrative tasks undertaken by municipalities, but it is clearly not a direct output of local pro-
duction.9 It also may constitute a proxy for measuring those services that a particular municipality
could provide at its own expense, going beyond the legal minimum. Other important outputs, such
as provision of primary and secondary education, do not fall within the responsibilities of Spanish
municipalities.
Spanish municipalities are bound by law to provide minimum services depending on their popula-
tion. Speciﬁcally, there are minimum services that all municipalities must provide, yet there are some
additional ones that only larger municipalities (with populations of over 5,000, 20,000, and 50,000,
which are the boundaries that deﬁne the diﬀerent categories) are bound to furnish. Table 1 presents
this type of information. The minimum services that each category of municipalities must provide
appear in the second column, whereas the third column column shows the diﬀerent output indicators
aimed to measure, or to proxy, the diﬀerent services.
The minimum services have led our output choice. Speciﬁcally, they are the list of outputs for years
1995 and 2000, along with summary statistics, is presented in Table 3. Therefore, we are measuring
eight services (listed in the ﬁrst column of Table 1) by means of the proxy indicators (listed in the
second column of Table 1). The choice has also been led by previous studies focusing on the eﬃciency
of other European local governments, since they are mostly endowed with the same competencies,
and diﬀerences are basically conﬁned to the education realm—which, in Spain, rely on regional and
central governments. The publicly available information does not go much further from the outputs in
Table 3. In addition to this, although the list of mandatory services to be provided varies according to
municipalities’ size, and therefore smaller municipalities could just be sticking to the legal minimum,
we include all outputs when modeling their production since the case could happen that some of them
might be going beyond the legal minimum.
Our selection of inputs is based on budgetary variables that reﬂect municipality costs. Speciﬁca-
lly, our deﬁnition of inputs reﬂects the economic structure of Spanish local government expenditures,
whose speciﬁcs are reported by Spanish legislation,10 which considers three basic categories: current,
or ordinary expenditures, capital expenditures, and ﬁnancial expenditures. Among them, current
expenditures are further divided into four chapters, or categories, which account for: i) personnel ex-
penditure; ii) current goods and services expenditures; iii) ﬁnancial expenditures; iv) current transfers.
Capital expenditures are also decomposed, falling into either real investments, or capital transfers.
http://www.igsap.map.es/cia/dispo/ce ingles index.htm.
9See also Ladd (1994), who addresses the ﬁscal impact of population growth.













































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































aThe former is what Table 2 refers to as capital expenditures (X4), i.e., all expenditures local govern-
ments implement either: i) to produce or acquire capital goods; ii) to acquire necessary goods to
provide local services in good condition; iii) ﬁnancial expenditures that are suitable for amortization.
On the other hand, capital transfers (X5) refer to the payments to institutions to ﬁnance certain
investments. Descriptive statistics for the year 1995 are provided in Table 3. Since our analysis is
entirely conﬁned to overall cost eﬃciency, the fact that some local government departments may be
actually sharing some costs does not raise any particular issue. Table 2 provides further details on
the contents of the economic budgetary classiﬁcation for local governments.
Apart from that corresponding to inputs and outputs, we also deﬁned another variable, representa-
tive of the operative level of quality of service, which describes the condition of public infrastructures.
In so doing, it is granted that, in every evaluation made, the benchmark in the frontier would oﬀer
the public services with a non-inferior level in the quality of the service than the observation under
analysis.
We also include information on the number of municipalities aﬃliated to each centralization cate-
gory. This information is reported in Table 4, for groups S1 and S2, and for each sample year (1995
and 2000).
4. Results
4.1. Decentralization economies’ results
Results for the βs2 coeﬃcient are provided in Table 5. It provides summary statistics for both types of
activity models considered (the convex DEA and the nonconvex FDH), as well as the decomposition
into the diﬀerent population classes, or categories—which we must bear in mind have been devised
according to the diﬀerent levels of competencies. For convenience, the three groups of municipalities
according to their competencies will be labeled as small (municipalities with a population under 5,000),
medium (municipalities with a population between 5,000 and 20,000), and large (municipalities with
a population over 20,000).
We must also recall what the precise interpretation of βs2 is, namely, the proportion of costs unit
s2 requires to reach the frontier corresponding to the same group S2, where same group refers to the
group of municipalities with equal level of competencies. Therefore, the closer the βs2 index is to one,
the lesser the diﬀerences between s2 municipality and those other ones bound to provide the same
amount of services and facilities are. In other words, if βs2 approaches unity, it should be interpreted
as evidence suggesting that the unit being evaluated is not far from the best-practice units in their
competencies’ group, i.e., those bound to provide the same services and facilities.
Results show that average eﬃciency is higher for large- and medium-sized municipalities. This
result is robust for both convex DEA and nonconvex FDH technologies, as well as both years 1995 andTable 2: Economic budgetary classiﬁcation
Expenditures Revenues
Operating transactions
Chapter I Personnel expenditure Chapter I Direct taxes
Chapter II Current goods & services expenditures Chapter II Indirect taxes
Chapter III Financial expenditures Chapter III Charges & other receipts
Chapter IV Current transfers Chapter IV Current transfers
Chapter V Patrimonial revenues
Capital transactions
Chapter VI Real investments Chapter VI Sales of real investments
Chapter VII Capital transfers Chapter VII Capital transfers
Chapter VIII Financial assets Chapter VIII Financial assets


























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































.Table 4: Number of municipalities in each centralization category (years 1995 and 2000)
Centralization category Year
1995 2000
S1 (less decentralized municipalities) 812 803

































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































.2000. However, under the FDH evaluation eﬃciency is substantially higher since, by construction, it is
more diﬃcult to ﬁnd dominating units. Divergences are more apparent when analyzing the disparities
(standard deviation), which do not diﬀer much for the three competencies’ groups under DEA, yet
they vary more according to FDH, due to the large amount of eﬃcient municipalities found here.
The second component of our the second stage analysis, i.e., the γs2 coeﬃcient, indicates the
proportion of costs that unit s2, aﬃliated to the group with higher level of competencies (S2), requires
to reach the frontier made up by those municipalities with lower competencies, i.e., to reach the frontier
made up by the observations in group S1. Therefore, if γs2 value were close to one, it would suggest
s2 municipality is not far from the frontier made up by other municipalities with lower levels of
competencies or, in other words, less decentralized municipalities. However, in this case we may also
expect values larger than unity, since the unit being evaluated is excluded from the reference set.11
Results are displayed in Table 6. They are, as expected, the same for small municipalities, since
this group cannot be compared to any other group with less competencies. However, results vary
for both medium and large municipalities, and in both cases eﬃciency worsens. However, the result
does not hold under FDH, for which the pattern is reversed. In this case, both medium and large
municipalities exhibit larger eﬃciency values. This result, however, should be assessed cautiously,
since DEA methodology is extremely dependent on the number of units being evaluated. It is a well-
known DEA phenomenon that as the number of units being evaluated increases, average eﬃciency
decreases because it is easier to ﬁnd units, or linear combination of units, whose performance is better
than that of the ﬁrm being evaluated. However, this phenomenon is more lessened under FDH since,
by construction, even if number of units is large it is more diﬃcult to be dominated since linear
combinations (i.e., convexity) are not permitted.
Following Section 2, the existence of decentralization economies is better assessed when analyzing
how the γs2/βs2 behaves. The relationship between both components is presented in Table 7. It shows
that, as suggested earlier, the dominance of decentralization economies is far more apparent under the
FDH nonconvex technology. In this case, for both years 1995 and 2000, decentralization economies
are found to be substantial (45%). Therefore, there was a considerable number of municipalities
whose performance improved when comparing them with a frontier made up by other municipalities
with less competencies. Although a non-negligible 55% of units showed decentralization diseconomies,
their distance to the unity is not as high as that of those units for which economies exist (0.762
and 0.769 for years 1995 and 2000, respectively, compared to 1.876 and 1.436 for the same periods).
However, decentralization economies are virtually nonexistent under DEA, since in year 2000, 96.67%
of observations (totalling 495 observations) presented decentralization diseconomies.
Table 8 reveals whether results for βs2 and γs2 densities diﬀer signiﬁcantly, according to Li (1996)
test. Results are provided for both years 1995 and 2000, and DEA and FDH models. This may be
























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































dalso thought of a way of ﬁnding out whether the existence of either decentralization economies or
diseconomies is signiﬁcant or not. The test reveals signiﬁcant diﬀerences for both indicators at the
1% signiﬁcance level, regardless of the convexity assumption and the time period. We also perform
the test for comparing the decentralization economies ratio for years 1995 and 2000. In this case, the
test reveals diﬀerences between years 1995 and 2000 are only signiﬁcant under the DEA evaluation.
The third component of the second stage analysis is our decentralization economies indicator.
It should be interpreted as the gains that municipalities obtain over time (between periods t and
t + 1) from focusing on a wider range of services and facilities. Results are reported in Table 9, and
they suggest that, over time (from 1995 to 2000), beneﬁts from a broader range have accrued for
municipalities with higher levels of competencies. In this case, results reconcile for both convex DEA
and nonconvex FDH, yet the eﬀect is, as expected, more tempered according to DEA. However, the
result is interesting since it suggests that, even in the convex case for which decentralization economies
were virtually nonexistent, there is a tendency for this type of economies to increase between years
1995 and 2000. Therefore, although our static results were somewhat conﬂictive when attempting to
reconcile DEA and FDH results, tendencies are more similar for our decentralization economies index.
However, diﬀerences emerge again when delving into the sources of change. Whereas the nonconvex
FDH suggest improvements over time are mostly brought about by technical change, and eﬃciency
change contributing negatively to the time evolution of the decentralization index, the relative contri-
butions are much more balanced under DEA. Yet in this case technical change is also the component
that contributes the most to the improvement of the decentralization economies index.
5. Concluding remarks
This article has analyzed the links between overall cost eﬃciency in Spanish local government and the
likely gains from empowering them with larger shares of self-government, by increasing their current
competencies. The issue is relevant since it is related to the hypothetical second decentralization
which could have followed the ﬁrst decentralization yet actually never took place. Therefore, one
may conclude this constitutes a relentlessly debated issue but remains largely unsolved. Our article
attempts to shed some light by pointing out what the likely gains from enhanced decentralization
could be in terms of overall cost eﬃciency.
The aims are achieved by initially dividing our sample of Spanish municipalities into diﬀerent
groups of units according to their competencies. Then, we consider an activity analysis model which
proceeds in two stages. Firstly, it conducts an evaluation of each municipality’s performance against
all other municipalities aﬃliated to the same group of competencies. Secondly, the eﬃciency of each
unit is evaluated against those municipalities empowered with lower levels of competencies or, put
it diﬀerently, which are bound to provide their populations with narrower ranges of services and



























































































































































































































































































































0decentralization economies, as opposed to output complexity or centralization economies—i.e., the case
could occur that providing populations with wider output bundles results into disproportionate cost
increases. The DEA convex technology results do not show substantial improvements from enhanced
decentralization, yet this ﬁnding may be related to the DEA well-known phenomenon of being highly
sensitive to the number of units being evaluated. In contrast, the phenomenon is far more lessened
under FDH, and in this case beneﬁts from enhanced decentralization accrue for almost 50% of our
sample.
According to the DEA convex frontier, it is not possible to recognize those units making up the
reference set. Thus, it could be the case that the municipality under analysis were evaluated against
a composite observation, made up by starking diﬀerences. Such a problem vanishes by removing the
convexity technological assumption, since the benchmark is built using an observation only, assuming
it is feasible to clone it and obtain other observations with identical features. Summing up, by atta-
ching greater importance to the convex frontier results we are assuming linear combinations among
observations which could be way too dissimilar. In contrast, the nonconvex reference frontier guaran-
tees total agreement in the features of the reference frontier and, therefore, it allows eﬃciency scores
to be fully representative of the results.
Since we have information for two periods (years 1995 and 2000), we may also attempt to weigh
in whether the likely decentralization gains improve over time. This aimed is achieved by devising
a Malmquist-type dynamic decentralization economies index which, in addition, provides us with
information as to the likely sources of change—whether it is due to technical change or a catching-up
eﬀect. In this case, results are robust for both methodologies, suggesting that, over time, beneﬁts for
larger municipalities (with more competencies) are increasing. This ﬁnding could be related to the
trend underwent in most public sector areas before Spain’s economy adhered to the Euro, following
the stipulations of the Maastricht Treaty on the sustainability of the government ﬁnancial position.
As far as we are aware, the relevance of the study is also related to the units under analysis, since
there is no empirical evidence to date on the eﬃciency of Spanish municipalities when considering the
majority of Spanish regions (at least those for which information was available). Previous studies have
analyzed the eﬃciency of Spanish local governments of diﬀerent regions, yet a more comprehensive
study was missing. In this line, our future research agenda comprises an analysis of the diﬀerences in
the performance of municipalities according to their home region, so as to accommodate diﬀerences
in taste for independence, autonomy, or ﬁscal authority (Garcia-Mil` a and McGuire, 2002).References
Ag´ undez Garc´ ıa, A. and Pedraja Chaparro, F. (2003). Descentralizaci´ on ﬁscal y eﬁciencia econ´ omica.
Revisi´ on de los principales aspectos y algunas ense˜ nanzas para el caso espa˜ nol. Papeles de Econom´ ıa
Espa˜ nola, 0(95):24–34.
Andersen, P. and Petersen, N. C. (1993). A procedure for ranking eﬃcient units in Data Envelopment
Analysis. Management Science, 39(10):1261–1264.
Aragon, Y., Daouia, A., and Thomas-Agnan, C. (2005). Nonparametric frontier estimation: A condi-
tional quantile-based approach. Econometric Theory, 21(2):358–389.
Balaguer-Coll, M. T., Prior, D., and Tortosa-Ausina, E. (2003). On the determinants of lo-
cal government performance: A two-stage nonparametric approach. Working Paper 2003/03,
Centre for Applied Economic Research (CAER), University of New South Wales, Sydney.
http://economics.web.unsw.edu.au/research/caer/.
Besley, T. and Coate, S. (2003). Centralized versus decentralized provision of local public goods: a
political economy approach. Journal of Public Economics, 87:2611–2637.
Bosch, N., Pedraja, F., and Su´ arez-Pandiello, J. (2000). Measuring the eﬃciency of Spanish municipal
refuse collection services. Local Government Studies, 26(3):71–90.
Bosch, N. and Su´ arez-Pandiello, J. (1993). Institutional restrictions and local public economics: A
Spanish approach. Journal of Public Finance and Public Choice, 11(2–3):111–121.
Bosch, N. and Su´ arez-Pandiello, J. (1995). Seven hypotheses about public choice and local spending
(a test from Spanish municipalities). Public Finance, 50(1):36–50.
Bradford, D., Malt, R., and Oates, W. (1969). The rising cost of local public services: Some evidence
and reﬂections. National Tax Journal, 22:185–202.
Briec, W., Kerstens, K., and Vanden Eeckaut, P. (2004). Non-convex technologies and cost functions:
Deﬁnitions, duality and nonparametric tests of convexity. Journal of Economics, 81(2):155–192.
Cai, H. and Treisman, D. (2004). State corroding federalism. Journal of Public Economics, 88:819–843.
Caves, D. W., Christensen, L. R., and Diewert, W. E. (1982). The economic theory of index numbers
and the measurement of input, output, and productivity. Econometrica, 50(6):1393–1414.
Cazals, C., Florens, J.-P., and Simar, L. (2002). Nonparametric frontier estimation: a robust approach.
Journal of Econometrics, 106:1–25.
Cerniglia, F. (2003). Decentralization in the public sector: quantitative aspects in federal and unitary
countries. Journal of Policy Modeling, 25:749–776.Charnes, A., Cooper, W. W., and Rhodes, E. (1978). Measuring the eﬃciency of decision making
units. European Journal of Operational Research, 2(6):429–444.
Crook, R. C. and Sverrisson, A. S. (2001). Decentralisation and poverty-alleviation in developing
countries: a comparative analysis or, is West Bengal unique? Working Paper 130, Institute of
Development Studies (IDS), University of Sussex, Brighton.
De Borger, B. and Kerstens, K. (1996a). Cost eﬃciency of Belgian local governments: A comparative
analysis of FDH, DEA, and econometric approaches. Regional Science and Urban Economics,
26:145–170.
De Borger, B. and Kerstens, K. (1996b). Radial and nonradial measures of technical eﬃciency: An
empirical illustration for Belgian local governments using an FDH reference technology. Journal of
Productivity Analysis, 7:41–62.
Deller, S. C. (1990). An application of a test for allocative eﬃciency in the local public sector. Regional
Science and Urban Economics, 20:395–406.
Deller, S. C. (1992). Production eﬃciency in local government: A parametric approach. Public
Finance/Finances Publiques, 47:32–44.
Deprins, D., Simar, L., and Tulkens, H. (1984). Measuring labor-eﬃciency in post oﬃces. In Marchand,
M., Pestieau, P., and Tulkens, H., editors, The Performance of Public Enterprises: Concepts and
Measurement, chapter 10, pages 243–267. North-Holland, Amsterdam.
Faguet, J.-P. (2004). Does decentralization increase government responsiveness to local needs? Evi-
dence from Bolivia. Journal of Public Economics, 88:867–893.
Fan, Y. (1994). Testing the goodness-of-ﬁt of a parametric density function by kernel method. Eco-
nometric Theory, 10:316–356.
Fan, Y. and Ullah, A. (1999). On goodness-of-ﬁt tests for weekly dependent processes using kernel
method. Journal of Nonparametric Statistics, 11:337–360.
F¨ are, R., Grosskopf, S., and Lovell, C. A. K. (1994). Production Frontiers. Cambridge University
Press, Cambridge.
Farrell, M. J. (1957). The measurement of productive eﬃciency. Journal of the Royal Statistical
Society, Ser.A,120:253–281.
Fox, K. J. (2001). Eﬃciency in the Public Sector, volume 1 of Studies in productivity and eﬃciency.
Kluwer Academic Publishers, Boston.Garcia-Mil` a, T. and McGuire, T. J. (2002). Fiscal decentralization in Spain: an asymmetric transition
to democracy. Technical report, Universitat Pompeu Fabra.
Gil Jim´ enez, F. (2001). Une analyse des desequilibres ﬁnanciers des collectivites locales en Espagne.
Revue d’Economie Regionale et Urbaine, 0(3):369–392.
Gim´ enez, V. M. and Prior, D. (2003). Evaluaci´ on frontera de la eﬁciencia en costes. Aplicaci´ on a los
ayuntamientos de Catalu˜ na. Papeles de Econom´ ıa Espa˜ nola, 95:113–124.
Gim´ enez, V. M. (2004). Un modelo FDH para la medida de la eﬁciencia en costes de los departamentos
universitarios. Hacienda P´ ublica Espa˜ nola/Revista de Econom´ ıa P´ ublica, 168(1):69–92.
Grosskopf, S. (1993). Eﬃciency and productivity. In Fried, H. O., Lovell, C. A. K., and Schmidt,
S. S., editors, The Measurement of Productive Eﬃciency: Techniques and Applications, chapter 4,
pages 161–193. Oxford University Press, Oxford.
Grosskopf, S. (2003). Some remarks on productivity and its decompositions. Journal of Productivity
Analysis, 20:459–474.
Grosskopf, S. and Hayes, K. J. (1993). Local public sector bureaucrats and their input choices. Journal
of Urban Economics, 33:151–166.
Grosskopf, S. and Yaisawarng, S. (1990). Economies of scope in the provision of local public services.
National Tax Journal, 43(1):61–74.
Hayes, K. J. and Chang, S. (1990). The relative eﬃciency of city manager and mayor-council forms
of government. Southern Economic Journal, 57:167–177.
Hughes, P. A. N. and Edwards, M. E. (2000). Leviathan vs. Lilliputian: A Data Envelopment Analysis
of government eﬃciency. Journal of Regional Science, 40(4):649–669.
Ladd, H. F. (1994). Fiscal impacts of population growth: a conceptual and empirical analysis. Regional
Science and Urban Economics, 24:661–686.
Li, Q. (1996). Nonparametric testing of closeness between two unknown distribution functions. Eco-
nometric Reviews, 15:261–274.
Molero, J.-C. (2001). Analysis of decentralization of public spending in Spain. Public Finance and
Management, 1(4):500–556.
Oates, W. E. (1972). Fiscal Federalism. Harcourt Brace Jovanovich, Inc., New York.
Pagan, A. and Ullah, A. (1999). Nonparametric Econometrics. Themes in modern econometrics.
Cambridge University Press, Cambridge.Park, B. U., Simar, L., and Weiner, C. (2000). The FDH estimator for productivity eﬃciency scores.
Econometric Theory, 16(6):855–877.
P´ erez Blanco, J. (1995). Estado descentralizado y eﬁciencia econ´ omica. Economistas, 0(65):18–24.
P´ erez Garc´ ıa, F. (1995). Haciendas locales: dimensi´ on, competencias y recursos. Economistas,
0(65):12–17.
Prieto, ´ A. M. and Zof´ ıo, J. L. (2001). Evaluating eﬀectiveness in public provision of infrastructure
and equipment: The case of Spanish municipalities. Journal of Productivity Analysis, 15(1):41–58.
Prior, D. and Sol` a, M. (2000). Technical eﬃciency and economies of diversiﬁcation in health care.
Health Care Management Science, 3:299–307.
Ruggiero, J. (1995). On the measurement and causes of technical ineﬃciency in local public services:
With an application to public education. Journal of Public Administration Research and Theory,
5(4):403–428.
Ruggiero, J. (1996). On the measurement of technical eﬃciency in the public sector. European Journal
of Operational Research, 90(3):553–565.
Sampaio de Sousa, M. and Stoˇ si´ c, B. (2005). Technical eﬃciency of the Brazilian municipalities:
correcting nonparametric frontier measurements for outliers. Journal of Productivity Analysis,
24:157–181.
Sheather, S. J. and Jones, M. C. (1991). A reliable data-based bandwidth selection method for kernel
density estimation. Journal of the Royal Statistical Society, Ser.B,53(3):683–690.
Silverman, B. W. (1986). Density Estimation for Statistics and Data Analysis. Chapman and Hall,
London.
Simar, L. and Wilson, P. W. (2000). Statistical inference in nonparametric frontier models: The state
of the art. Journal of Productivity Analysis, 13(1):49–78.
Smith, B. C. (1985). Decentralization: The Territorial Dimension of State. George Allen & Unwin,
London.
Sol´ e-Oll´ e, A. (1997). Tax exporting and redistributive politics: An empirical investigation on the
determinants of Spanish local tax structure. Public Finance, 52(1):102–124.
Sol´ e-Oll´ e, A. (2001). Determinantes del gasto p´ ublico local: ¿necesidades de gasto o capacidad ﬁscal?
Revista de Econom´ ıa Aplicada, 25:115–156.Sol´ e-Oll´ e, A. and Bosch, N. (2002). On the relationship between local authority size and expenditure:
Lessons for the design of intergovenmental transfers in Spain. Technical report, Institut d’Economia
de Barcelona, Barcelona.
Taylor, L. L. (1995). Allocative eﬃciency and local government. Journal of Urban Economics, 37:201–
211.
Tiebout, C. (1956). A pure theory of local expenditures. Journal of Political Economy, 64:416–424.
Tulkens, H. (1993). On FDH eﬃciency analysis: Some methodological issues and applications to retail
banking, courts, and urban transit. Journal of Productivity Analysis, 4:183–210.
Tulkens, H. and Vanden Eeckaut, P. (1995). Non-parametric eﬃcienct, progress and regress measures
for panel data: Methodological aspects. European Journal of Operational Research, 80:474–499.
Vanden Eeckaut, P., Tulkens, H., and Jamar, M.-A. (1993). Cost eﬃciency in Belgian municipalities.
In Fried, H. O., Lovell, C. A. K., and Schmidt, S. S., editors, The Measurement of Productive
Eﬃciency, chapter 12, pages 300–334. Oxford University Press, Oxford.
Vela, J. M. (1996). Latest developments in local government accounting in Spain. Financial Accoun-
tability & Management, 12(3):205–224.
Wallis, J. J. and Oates, W. E. (1988). Decentralization in the public sector: an empirical study of
the state and local government. In Rosen, H. S., editor, Fiscal Federalism: Quantitative Studies,
National Bureau of Economic Research, chapter 1, pages 5–32. University of Chicago Press, Chicago
and London.
Worthington, A. and Dollery, B. (2000a). An empirical analysis of productivity change in Australian
local government, 1993/94 to 1995/96. Working Paper Series in Economics 2000–3, University of
New England, School of Economic Studies.
Worthington, A. C. (2000). Cost eﬃciency in Australian local government: A comparative analysis
of mathematical programming and econometric approaches. Financial Accountability and Manage-
ment, 16:201–223.
Worthington, A. C. and Dollery, B. E. (2000b). An empirical survey of frontier eﬃciency measurement
techniques in local government. Local Government Studies, 26:23–52.
Worthington, A. C. and Dollery, B. E. (2000c). Measuring eﬃciency in local governments’ planning
and regulatory function. Public Productivity & Management Review, 23(4):469–485.
Worthington, A. C. and Dollery, B. E. (2000d). Productive eﬃciency and the Australian local govern-
ment grants process: An empirical analysis of New South Wales local government. Australasian
Journal of Regional Studies, 6(1):95–121.